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Abstract
Web services are a powerful distributed computing abstraction in that they enable users
to develop workflows that incorporate data and information processing services located in
multiple organizational domains. Fully realizing the potential of this computing paradigm
requires a flexible authorization mechanism that can function correctly without a priori
knowledge of the users in the system. Trust negotiation has been proposed as a viable
solution to this problem, but doing so within the framework provided by existing web
services standards remains an unsolved problem. In this paper, we show how existing web
services standards can be extended to enable fully standards-compliant support for trust
negotiation. We also show that it is possible to compile trust negotiation policies specified
using the WS-SecurityPolicy standard into a representation that is suitable for analysis by
Clouseau, a highly-efficient trust negotiation policy compliance checker. Lastly, we show
that the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation can be parameterized to act as a
trust engine that can be used by the WS-Trust standard to facilitate these negotiations.
1 Introduction
Web services and other service oriented architectures stand poised to usher in a new era
of distributed computing. Standards such as WSDL [8] and UDDI [20] enable entities
to describe and deploy computational services that can be searched for, discovered, and
utilized by other entities. Furthermore, languages such as BPEL4WS [7] can be used to
describe potentially complex workflows that utilize data and computational services spread
across multiple administrative domains. Fully realizing the potential of this computing
paradigm requires a flexible authorization mechanism that can function correctly without
a priori knowledge of the users in the system, as this would allow for the discovery and
composition of new services at runtime. Unfortunately, existing web services security
mechanisms are largely identity-based; this requires that a user be, in some sense, “hard-
wired” into every administrative domain that they wish to access services from. This
severely hinders the full potential of the web services model.
Trust negotiation [21] has previously been proposed as an appropriate authorization
model for use in a web services context. In trust negotiation, resources are protected by
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attribute-based access policies. Entities use digital credentials issued by third-party at-
tribute certifiers (e.g., professional organizations, employers, government bodies, etc.) to
prove various characteristics about themselves and their surrounding environment. Be-
cause these attributes might also be considered sensitive, they can optionally be protected
by release policies constraining the individuals to whom they can be disclosed. As such,
a trust negotiation session evolves into a bilateral and iterative exchange of policies and
credentials with the end goal of developing new trust relationships on-the-fly. Because
these types of systems allow resource administrators to specify the intension of a policy,
rather than its logical extension (i.e., an explicit access control list), authorized entities
can gain access to available resources without requiring that their identity be known a
priori.
The decentralized and expressive nature of trust negotiation makes it a natural fit for
web services computing environments. As a result, previous research has explored this
connection to some extent [4, 10]. While this work has made important contributions to
the fields of trust negotiation and authorization architectures for web services, it has not
addressed one important consideration: compliance with existing web services standards.
There are currently a myriad of security-oriented standards in the web services domain
that aim to enable many advanced security features. Rather than further cluttering this
space with yet other standards, it is important to consider how existing standards might be
used to support more advanced authorization paradigms, such as trust negotiation. In this
paper, we consider exactly this problem. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We show how the existing token-based security model described by the
WS-SecurityPolicy [16] standard can be used to specify trust negotiation policies. We
then describe a standards-compliant claims dialect that can be used in conjunction
with WS-SecurityPolicy to enable the specification of more expressive authorization
policies.
• We propose extensions to WS-Trust’s challenge/response framework [17] that can be
used to facilitate trust negotiation sessions in a fully standards-compliant manner.
These extensions do not limit the strategies, policies, or credential types that can be
used during the trust negotiation process.
• We present a procedure for compiling trust negotiation policies specified using the
WS-SecurityPolicy standard into a format suitable for analysis by Clouseau [13], a
highly efficient and language-agnostic policy compliance checker for trust negotiation
systems.
• We show that the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation can be parameter-
ized to act as a trust engine—as defined by WS-Trust—that is capable of driving
standards-compliant trust negotiation sessions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related efforts in
using trust negotiation within a web services context, as well as overview important web
services security and trust standards. Section 3 describes how trust negotiation policies
can be specified using the WS-SecurityPolicy standard. In Section 4, we show how to ex-
ecute trust negotiations through extensions to the WS-Trust standard. Section 5 focuses
on systems issues, including a correct and complete compilation procedure that enables
policies specified using WS-SecurityPolicy to be translated into a format suitable for anal-
ysis by the Clouseau compliance checker. We further describe how the TrustBuilder2
framework for trust negotiation can be parameterized to function as the trust engine used
by WS-Trust during these negotiations. We then present our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Related Work
In this section, we provide background information on a number of relevant web services
security standards, as well as discuss related work involving the use of trust negotiation in
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the web services domain.
2.1 Web Services Security Standards
At their most basic level, web services are nothing more than software components that
communicate with one another by sending XML messages enclosed in SOAP envelopes.
Each of these envelopes consists of a header containing routing information and other
meta-data, as well as a body that encapsulates the “payload” of the message. Since these
messages are often routed over public networks, such as the Internet, they are susceptible
to observation and tampering by unauthorized entities. The WS-Security standard [18]
defines a number of useful primitives that can help protect against these types of threats.
This standard defines an optional security header that can be used to transport key mate-
rial, message authentication codes, and various types of security tokens that can be used
to authenticate users or protect the confidentiality or integrity of messages.
In order to take full advantage for the security features enabled by WS-Security, service
administrators need some means of defining the security requirements for a web service.
The WS-SecurityPolicy standard [18] defines policy assertions that allow administrators
to place constraints on the types of authentication tokens that need to be presented to
gain access to a service, the portions of incoming and outgoing messages that need to
be encrypted or authenticated, suites of cryptographic algorithms that are supported,
and other security-relevant properties of their service. The basic policy structures and
connectives defined by WS-Policy [19] are then used to combine these policy assertions
into comprehensive security policies.
The final web services standard that we will leverage in this paper is WS-Trust [17].
Properly exchanging and using the types of security tokens defined in the WS-Security
standard requires that each party involved can assess the trustworthiness of each security
token that it acquires. WS-Trust leverages the security primitives defined in WS-Security
along with additional extensions to enable services to carry out protocols designed to issue,
renew, and validate security tokens, as well as broker trust relationships. In Section 4, we
will describe how the negotiation and challenge extensions to WS-Trust can be used to
carry out trust negotiation sessions in a standards-compliant manner.
2.2 Trust Negotiation for Web Services
While much research effort has been placed into the foundations of trust negotiation—such
languages for expressing resource access policies (e.g., [2, 3, 9, 15]), protocols and strategies
for conducting trust negotiations (e.g., [4, 11, 12, 23]), and logics for reasoning about the
outcomes of these negotiations (e.g., [6, 22])—only a few research groups have investigated
the applications of trust negotiation within the web services domain.
Bertino et al. describe Trust-X [4], an XML-based framework for supporting trust ne-
gotiations in peer-to-peer systems. In Trust-X , each user creates an X -profile that stores
X -TNL certificates [3] describing their attributes, uncertified declarations containing in-
formation about the user (e.g., preferences, phone numbers, or other such information),
and X -TNL policies to protect their sensitive resources. Since these data are all specified
using XML, they can be queried or constrained using standard query languages, such as
XQuery [5]. To allow users to optimize various aspects of the trust negotiation process,
Trust-X supports a variety of interchangeable trust negotiation strategies. Another par-
ticularly innovative feature of the Trust-X framework is its support for trust tickets, which
are receipts that attest to the fact that a user recently completed some negotiation with
another party that be presented within some limited lifetime to bypass redundant portions
of future negotiations. Although Trust-X makes heavy use of XML, it was not designed
specifically for the web services environment. In particular, the authors do not specify how
these trust negotiations might be carried out within the framework provided by other web
services protocols and standards.
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In [10], Koshutanski and Massacci describe a trust negotiation framework designed
for web services. This framework facilitates the composition of access policies across the
constituent pieces of a workflow, the discovery of credentials needed to satisfy these policies,
the management of the distributed access control process, and the logic to determine what
missing credentials must be located and provided to satisfy a given policy. This work
operates at the business process level by determining and satisfying the composite access
control policy for a workflow prior to its execution; as a result, existing web services
security standards are not used. Furthermore, policies are represented using a datalog-
based language, rather than an existing standards-compliant language.
3 Specifying Trust Negotiation Policies
During a trust negotiation session, attribute-based policies are used to describe the char-
acteristics of the entities authorized to access a given resource. Digital credentials are then
used to satisfy these policies; in a web services context, these credentials can be repre-
sented using the formats specified in WS-Security and its extensions. In this section, we
address the problem of representing trust negotiation policies for web services. We first
show that policy assertions defined in WS-SecurityPolicy can be used to specify basic trust
negotiation policies, and then present a standards-compliant claims dialect that extends
WS-SecurityPolicy to enable the specification of more expressive trust negotiation policies.
3.1 Basic Policy Specification
WS-SecurityPolicy takes a token-based approach to security, in that policies identify spe-
cific security tokens that must be presented in order to gain access to a particular service.
The WS-SecurityPolicy specification defines policy assertions that can be used to require
the use of Kerberos tickets, SAML assertions, and X.509 certificates, as well as other se-
curity token formats. As an example, the following policy assertion requires the use of an
X.509 certificate issued by the Better Business Bureau’s (fictitious) security token service:
<sp:X509Token xmlns:sp="..." xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>C=US/O=Better Business Bureau/CN=sts.bbb.org</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
Trust negotiation policies are typically more complicated than this, however,
as they can include multiple attribute constraints. Requiring the use of multiple
security tokens can be accomplished through the use of the basic policy connectives
defined by WS-Policy. WS-Policy defines the ExactlyOne and All connectives,
which require that either one or all subclauses of a particular clause in a policy
be satisfied in order for that clause of the policy to be satisfied. Although these
two connectives can be used to express any arbitrary policy structure, the WS-
Policy specification recommends that policies be expressed in disjunctive normal
form (DNF) using a policy structure of the following form:
<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<!-- Policy assertion (1,1) -->
...
<!-- Policy assertion (1,n_1) -->
</wsp:All>
...
<wsp:All>
<!-- Policy assertion (m,1) -->
...
<!-- Policy assertion (m,n_m) -->
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
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<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:sp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu
</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org
</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
Figure 1: An example trust negotiation policy requiring users to present X.509 cer-
tificates from the State University registrar, as well as the ACM.
The ExactlyOne clause in the above policy indicates that exactly one of its child
nodes must be satisfied in order for the policy to be satisfied. Since each child node
is an All clause, satisfying this policy requires that all policy assertions (i, j) are
satisfied for some i where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n i.
Combining the security token policy assertions from WS-SecurityPolicy with the
policy connectives defined in WS-Policy allows us to specify a range of interest-
ing trust negotiation policies. For example, consider a service that wishes to be
protected by a policy requiring that users present X.509 certificates issued by the
registrar of State University and the ACM; this would indicate that authorized
users of the service need to be students of State University and members of the
ACM. Assuming that State University’s registrar and the ACM each run an on-
line security token service (STS) that manages the credentials issued within their
respective domains, Figure 1 illustrates how such a policy could be written in a
standards-compliant manner.
3.2 Encoding Advanced Attribute Constraints
While the above, strictly token-based approach to trust negotiation policy specifica-
tion works in some circumstances, it is inadequate for others. For example, consider
complex credentials such as driver’s licenses that contain information about the type
of vehicles the bearer is authorized to drive and the date of birth of the bearer, or
employee IDs that indicate the employee’s rank, department, and year of hire. The
policies used in the previous section can only determine whether an entity has an em-
ployee ID or driver’s license, but cannot constrain the attribute fields—also known
as claims—encoded in the certificate.
The authors of the WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-Trust standards recognize that
placing constraints on the claims encoded in a security token is an important aspect
of security policy specification. As such, these standards define an optional Claims
element that can be included in the security token policy assertions that make up a
given security policy. These standards do not specify the contents of given Claims
element; to allow for maximum extensibility, third parties can define claims dialects
that specify the format and contents of these elements.
To facilitate the use of more expressive—yet standards-compliant—trust nego-
tiation policies within the WS-SecurityPolicy framework, we have developed one
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Element Description
/cl:Claim This element is used to encode a constraint on some claim encoded
in the security token to which it refers. These constraints take the
form of (attribute, operation, value) triples.
/cl:Claim/cl:Attribute The name of the attribute or claim to which this constraint refers.
/cl:Claim/cl:Op The operation portion of a constraint triple. Acceptable values
for this field are EQ, GT, LT, GTEQ, and LTEQ. These values denote
“equals,” “greater than,” “less than,” “greater than or equal to,”
and “less than or equal to,” respectively.
/cl:Claim/cl:Value The value field of the constraint triple.
/cl:Ownership This element is used to indicate whether proof of ownership of the
security token to which it refers needs to be demonstrated when
the token is disclosed.
/cl:Ownership/@Status This optional attribute may be set to either true or false depend-
ing on whether proof of ownership is required. If this attribute is
not present, a default value of true is assumed.
Table 1: Descriptions of the elements making up our claims dialect.
such claims dialect. Our claims dialect allows policy writers to place an arbitrary
number of (attribute name, comparison operator, value) constraint triples on the
claims encoded in a security token. This format was chosen because it is suffi-
ciently expressive to represent instances of the constraint checking problem. For
example, the constraint triple (License Type, EQ, CDL) would require that the
“License Type” field of a particular driver’s license security token be set to the
value “CDL.” Furthermore, our claims dialect provides a mechanism through which
policy writers can require not only the disclosure of a particular security token,
but also a demonstration of proof-of-ownership. This enables explicit differentiate
between credentials that must be owned by the individual requesting access to a
particular service and other supporting credentials that must be presented. The
XML elements defined by this claims dialect are summarized in Table 1; a more
detailed treatment of this claims dialect can be found in the XML schema defining
the dialect (see Appendix A).
Figure 2 contains a more complex version of the policy presented in Figure 1.
This version of the policy leverages our claims dialect to restrict service access to
graduate students of State University who have been members of the ACM since at
least 2006. The use of the Ownership element inside each of the Claims elements
requires that proof of ownership be demonstrated for both tokens.
4 Trust Negotiation Using WS-Trust
Now that we have described how trust negotiation policies can be specified in a
standards-compliant manner, we must show how trust negotiation protocols can be
executed within the framework provided by existing web services standards.
4.1 WS-Trust Basics
As described in Section 2, the WS-Trust standard focuses on the brokerage of trust
relationships between entities in a web services environment. In the trust model
articulated in the WS-Trust standard, trust relationships are represented as security
tokens. For example, if Alice runs a web service that she would like to allow Bob’s
friends to use, she would protect her web service with a WS-SecurityPolicy policy
requiring a security token issued by Bob. This type of token would serve as formal
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<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:sp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu
</sp:IssuerName>
<wst:Claims Dialect="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd">
<cl:Claim>
<cl:Attribute>Type</cl:Attribute>
<cl:Op>EQ</cl:Op>
<cl:Value>Graduate Student</cl:Value>
</cl:Claim>
<cl:Ownership Status="true"/>
</wst:Claims>
</sp:X509Token>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org
</sp:IssuerName>
<wst:Claims Dialect="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd">
<cl:Claim>
<cl:Attribute>MemberSince</cl:Attribute>
<cl:Op>LTEQ</cl:Op>
<cl:Value>2006</cl:Value>
</cl:Claim>
<cl:Ownership Status="true"/>
</wst:Claims>
</sp:X509Token>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
Figure 2: A more complex example trust negotiation policy that makes use of our
claim dialect.
proof of the fact that Bob is friends with a certain individual. The WS-Trust
standard then goes on to define the protocols that can be used to issue, renew,
revoke, and check the validity of security tokens; later in this section, we will show
that the token issuance protocol described by WS-Trust can be extended to enable
native support for trust negotiation. As a means of introduction to this protocol,
we now discuss an example execution of the basic protocol.
Figure 3 illustrates how the scenario described in our previous example might
make use of the WS-Trust standard to control access to Alice’s web service. When
a user Charlie tries to access Alice’s service, he is returned a WS-SecurityPolicy
policy indicating that he must present a security token that identifies him as a
friend of Bob’s before he can access the service in question. Charlie does not have
such a token, so he contacts Bob’s STS and sends a SOAP message containing a
RequestSecurityToken element indicating that he would like to be issued a secu-
rity token identifying him as a friend of Bob’s. This message includes a copy of
Charlie’s public key certificate—which is attached as described in the WS-Security
standard—and is digitally signed to ensure its authenticity. Bob’s STS then checks
to see if Charlie is on the access control list (ACL) containing the names of Bob’s
friends. Since Charlie is on this list, the STS generates a security token for Charlie,
embeds the token in a RequestedSecurityTokenResponse element, and includes
this element in the body of a SOAP message. This message is then signed, en-
crypted, and returned to Charlie, who can then use the encapsulated token to
access Alice’s service.
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Bob’s STS Charlie Alice’s Service
Access?
“Bob’s Friend” Token?
RequestSecurityToken
“Bob’s Friend”
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
Check
ACL
Figure 3: An example of the WS-Trust token issuance mechanism.
4.2 Trust Negotiation Extensions to WS-Trust
Since the issuance of a security token might not always fit within a single request and
response, WS-Trust includes a negotiation and challenge framework that enables
support for more complex token issue protocols. After a requestor discloses an ini-
tial RequestSecurityToken message, this framework allows the requestor and STS
to send any number of RequestSecurityTokenResponse messages containing arbi-
trary XML structures to one another before the final RequestSecurityTokenResponse
message containing a new security token is disclosed (or a fault is generated). While
these extensions were intended to support basic challenge/response protocols and
legacy key exchange protocols, they can also be used to support trust negotiation.
Table 2 describes the TNInit and TNExchange XML elements that we have de-
fined to encapsulate trust negotiation sessions within the WS-Trust negotiation and
challenge framework. The TNInit element is exchanged by participants during the
first round of the negotiation and contains information used to parameterize the
negotiation that is about to take place. The remaining rounds of the negotiation
consist of exchanges of TNExchange elements containing PolicyCollection and
TokenCollection elements describing the policies and credentials being disclosed,
respectively. Policies are encoded as described in Section 3, while security tokens
are contained in Token elements that include a token type descriptor (in the form of
a URI), the token itself (encoded as described in the WS-Trust specification), and
an optional proof of ownership.
The above two-phase negotiation process enables support for an arbitrary array
of trust negotiation protocols within the WS-Trust framework. Since the entities
participating in the negotiation use the exchange of TNInit objects to choose which
negotiation strategies and security token formats will be supported, the security
token and policy exchanges that take place during the later phase of the negotiation
can occur in accordance with these initial choices. Furthermore, the schema defining
the TNInit and TNExchange elements (see Appendix B) can itself be easily extended
to include support for the exchange of data items other than policies and security
tokens (e.g., proof fragments [1, 22], uncertified claims [4, 6], or trust tickets [4]).
Another benefit of this method of supporting trust negotiation is that the tokens
issued by the STS function in many ways like the “trust tickets” described by Bertino
et al. in [4]. That is, after a single successful trust negotiation, a service requestor
can access the protected web service many times within the lifetime of the token
issued by the STS.
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Element Description
tn:TNInit This element is used to encapsulate initialization informa-
tion that needs to be passed between negotiation parties.
tn:TNInit/tn:SignatureMaterial This holds one party’s contribution to the signature chal-
lenge used when proving token ownership.
tn:TNInit/tn:StrategyFamily This element identifies one strategy family [23] supported
by the sending entity. This element may occur multiple
times in the first TNInit element, indicating that multi-
ple strategy families are supported. The TNInit element
returned by the second negotiation participant must in-
clude exactly one copy of this element, which indicates the
strategy that was chosen for use during this negotiation.
tn:TNInit/tn:TokenFormat This element identifies one security token type supported
by the sending entity. This element may occur multiple
times, indicating that multiple security token formats are
supported.
tn:TNExchange This element is used to encapsulate all information trans-
ferred during one exchange of a trust negotiation session.
tn:TNExchange/tn:TokenCollection This element contains one or more tn:Token elements em-
bodying the security tokens disclosed during a single trust
negotiation exchange.
tn:TNExchange/tn:PolicyCollection This element contains one or more wsp:Policy elements
embodying the trust negotiation policies disclosed during
a single trust negotiation exchange.
tn:Token This element encapsulates information describing a single
security token that is being disclosed.
tn:Token/wst:TokenType This element contains a URI describing the type of secu-
rity token being disclosed.
tn:Token/wst:RequestedSecurityToken The security token being disclosed is encoded in this ele-
ment, which is defined in the WS-Trust specification.
tn:Token/tn:OwnershipProof This optional element contains a Base64-encoded repre-
sentation of a response to a proof of ownership challenge
for this security token.
Table 2: Descriptions of the elements making up our extensions to the WS-Trust
negotiation and challenge mechanism.
4.3 An Example Standards-Compliant Trust Negotiation
In Figure 4, we see that Charlie is attempting to access a web service that uses trust
negotiation authorization controls. Upon requesting access to the service, Charlie
is told that he must present a security token issued by State University’s STS in
order to access the service. He contacts the STS and sends a SOAP message con-
taining a RequestSecurityToken element indicating that he needs a security token
to access the protected web service. The STS returns a SOAP message containing
RequestSecurityTokenResponse element that initiates a trust negotiation with
Charlie. This element contains a TNInit element containing initialization informa-
tion for the trust negotiation session, as well as a TNExchange element containing a
PolicyCollection element that includes the policy from Figure 2. Recall that this
policy requires users to prove that they are graduate students at State University
and that they have been a member of the ACM since at least 2006.
Upon receiving this message, Charlie creates a new SOAP message to the STS
consisting of a RequestSecurityTokenResponse message containing a TNInit el-
ement to finalize the negotiation parameters, as well as a TNExchange element.
The TNExchange contains a TokenCollection element that includes a copy of
his ACM membership token (and its corresponding proof of ownership) and a
PolicyCollection element containing a single Policy element requiring that the
STS prove that it is certified by State University. This message is then sent to the
STS, which returns another SOAP message to Charlie containing a
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State University’s STS Charlie State University’s Service
Access?
Token from STS?
RequestSecurityToken
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
TNInit, TNExchange Psvc
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
TNInit, TNExchange
P
id
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
TNExchange
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
TNExchange
RequestSecurityTokenResponse
Figure 4: An example illustrating the use of extensions to the WS-Trust negotiation
and challenge framework to facilitate trust negotiation sessions.
RequestSecurityTokenResponse with an embedded TNExchange element contain-
ing a TokenCollection element that includes the requested security token (and
its corresponding proof of ownership). This message satisfies Charlie, who then
discloses his Student ID token, which identifies him as a graduate student of State
University. At this point, the STS returns a SOAP message containing the final
RequestSecurityTokenResponse element, which includes a new security token in-
dicating that Charlie has satisfied the web service’s policy. Charlie then discloses
this token to the web service and is granted access.
5 Systems Considerations
We now focus on the systems aspects of the trust negotiation process. We first
show that policies expressed as in Section 3 can be compiled into a format suitable
for analysis by Clouseau, an efficient trust negotiation policy compliance checker.
This not only reduces implementation overheads, but also establishes Clouseau
as a general-purpose compliance checker capable of analyzing both Datalog-based
and industry-standard policy languages. We then show that the TrustBuilder2
framework for trust negotiation can be parameterized to function as a trust engine
capable of driving these types of negotiation sessions.
5.1 Efficient Policy Compliance Checking
Given a policy p and a set of security tokens S, a policy compliance checker finds one
or more minimal subsets of S that can be used to satisfy p. We call such minimal
subsets satisfying sets of security tokens. Compliance checkers are used to find sets
of local security tokens that can be disclosed to satisfy a remote policy, as well as
to determine whether the security tokens disclosed by a remote party can be used
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;; This policy is satisfied by graduate students at State University
;; who have been members of the ACM since at least 2006.
(defrule rule-service-access
(credential (id ?istud) (issuer ?issstud) (owned true) (map ?mstud))
(credential (id ?iacm) (issuer ?issacm) (owned true) (map ?macm))
(test (eq ?issstud "C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu"))
(test (eq "Graduate Student" (?mstud get "Type")))
(test (eq ?issacm "C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org"))
(test (<= (?macm get "MemberSince") 2006))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name server)
(credentials ?istud ?iacm))))
Figure 5: The policy presented in Figure 2 specified using Clouseau’s policy syntax.
to satisfy some local policy. Before the techniques outlined in this paper can be put
to use, we require a compliance checker capable of analyzing policies written using
the WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy standards.
Clouseau is an optimized policy compliance checker designed for trust nego-
tiation systems [13]. Internally, Clouseau represents policies as sets of patterns
placing constraints on the collection of security tokens that must be presented to
access a given resource. When invoked, Clouseau translates the provided set of
security tokens into an abstract object representation and then leverages efficient
pattern matching algorithms to determine the collection of all satisfying sets of
security tokens. Space limitations prevent a full discussion of the format of the
constraint patterns analyzed by Clouseau, so we instead refer interested readers
to [13] for more details. As an introduction to Clouseau’s policy syntax, Figure 5
shows the policy presented in Figure 2 specified using this syntax.
In [13] the authors describe a compilation procedure for translating role-based
policies written in the RT0 and RT1 policy languages [15] into the intermediate
policy representation analyzed by Clouseau. We now describe such a compilation
procedure that can be used to translate policies specified as in Section 3 into a format
suitable for analysis by Clouseau. This translation is actually quite natural, as the
token-based approach to trust and security embodied by WS-Trust maps directly
onto the intermediate policy language used by Clouseau.
In presenting the following compilation procedure, we assume that policies are
expressed in DNF, as recommended by [19]. That is, we assume that policies are
a collection of n All clauses, each identifying one satisfying set of security tokens
for the policy. The ith such All clause in the policy should be processed as follows.
First, a new rule will be created for this All clause:
(defrule rule-<i>
In the above rule, the <i> will be replaced with a counter indicating which All
clause the rule represents. Assume this All clause has m Token elements. The kth
such element will be processed as follows. First, a constraint will be added to the
policy requiring that this token be presented:
(credential (id ?id-<k>) (issuer ?iss-<k>) (owned ?o-<k>) (map ?m-<k>))
If this Token’s Claims element or IssuerName element specifies that the token
must be issued by some specific issuer, <issuer>, the following test will be added
to rule-<i>:
(test (eq ?iss-<k> <issuer>))
If this Token’s Claims element contains the assertion <Ownership Status="true">,
then the following test will be added to rule-<i>:
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(test (eq ?o-<k> true))
For all other constraint triples encoded in the Claims element of this token,
the following test will be inserted. Note that <op> is either eq, <, >, <=, or >=
depending on whether the operation encoded in the constraint tuple is EQ, LT, GT,
LTEQ, or GTEQ. Similarly, <name> and <value> are placeholders for the attribute
name and constraint value identified in the constraint triple.
(test (<op> (?m-<k> get <name>) <value>))
After each Token element in the ith All clause has been processed as above,
rule-<i> will be terminated as follows:
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name rule-<i>)
(credentials ?id-1 ... ?id-<m>))))
This process then repeats for each other All clause defined by the policy. We
now present the following theorem regarding the correctness and completeness of
this compilation procedure:
Theorem 1. Assume that a trust negotiation policy p specified using the WS-Policy
and WS-SecurityPolicy specifications is compiled using the above procedure into a
Clouseau policy p′. Given the policy p′ and a set of security tokens S, the satisfying
sets s1, . . . , sn returned by Clouseau are exactly the subsets of S that satisfy the
original policy p.
Proof. Recall that the policy p is expressed in DNF form; that is, p is a disjunction
of n conjunctive clauses. Note that each such conjunctive clause identifies a unique
set of security tokens that can be presented to satisfy p. For each conjunctive clause
ci containing identifying mi security tokens, the compilation process defined above
creates one Clouseau rule containing mi patterns defined to match the tokens
identified by ci. Furthermore, for each security token tj identified by ci, the above
process creates one test clause to check each claim constraint imposed on tj by the
policy p. Since no other rules are inserted into the policy p′, Clouseau cannot find
any satisfying sets other than those identified by p when analyzing the policy p′.
Similarly, since one such rule is created for each conjunctive clause (i.e., satisfying
set) in p, Clouseau finds all satisfying sets in p when invoked on the policy p′.
5.2 TrustBuilder2 as a WS-Trust Trust Engine
The WS-Trust standard defines a trust engine as “a conceptual system that evalu-
ates the security-related aspects of a message” [17]. Revisiting the basic WS-Trust
token issuance example from Section 4.1, the trust engine would have been respon-
sible for checking to see that Charlie was on Bob’s list of friends. To execute the
more complex example from Section 4.3, a more powerful trust engine would be
required. This trust engine would need to determine which policies and/or security
tokens should be disclosed at each round of the negotiation as a function of the
existing negotiation state and the policies and/or security tokens that were received
during the previous round. We now argue that in the future such a trust engine
could—with minimal effort—be implemented using TrustBuilder2, an extensible
open-source framework for trust negotiation.1
1TrustBuilder2 is available for download at http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/tn.
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To substantiate this claim, we must show that TrustBuilder2 can analyze policies
specified using WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy, and that it is at least as extensi-
ble as the trust negotiation extensions to WS-Trust described in Section 4. Recall
from Section 5.1 that trust negotiation policies specified using WS-Policy and WS-
SecurityPolicy can be compiled into a format that is analyzable by the Clouseau
compliance checker. Since TrustBuilder2 supports Clouseau natively, it can ana-
lyze policies specified as described in Section 3. In Section 4.2, we showed that the
extensibility afforded by our extensions to WS-Trust comes from two sources: the
ability to support arbitrary trust negotiation strategies and security token formats,
and the ability to extend the TNExchange element to transport trust negotiation
evidence other than policies and security tokens.
The TrustBuilder2 framework makes use of an extensible data type hierarchy that
users can extend to add support for new security token formats, policy languages, or
trust negotiation evidence types (e.g., trust tickets, etc.). Additionally, the primary
components of a trust negotiation system—including strategies—are represented as
abstract interfaces that can be extended or replaced by users of the system. Trust-
Builder2 also leverages a two-phase negotiation model in which participants first
exchange InitBrick data structures allowing them to establish a mutually-acceptable
system configuration. The remaining rounds of the negotiation involve the exchange
TrustMessage objects that encapsulate the policies, security tokens, and other forms
of evidence exchanged during the negotiation; note that this mirrors the exchange of
TNInit and TNExchange elements described in Section 4.2. As a result, each message
exchange during our trust negotiation extensions to WS-Trust can be translated in
a one-to-one fashion into an object that can be parsed TrustBuilder2. TrustBuilder2
can then examine the state of the negotiation, determine the next step, and gener-
ate an appropriate response. This response can then be translated into the XML
elements described in Section 4.2 and transmitted.
6 Conclusions
Web services are a promising distributed computing paradigm, but fully unlocking
their potential requires flexible authorization techniques that can function correctly
without a priori knowledge of the users in the system. In this paper, we have
shown that the adoption of trust negotiation within this realm can occur within the
framework provided by existing web services security standards. In particular, we
showed that after defining a rudimentary claims dialect—which is fully-compliant
with the WS-Trust standard—the WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy standards can
be used to define a range of expressive trust negotiation policies. We also showed
that WS-Trust’s negotiation and challenge framework can be extended to act as a
standards-compliant transport mechanism within which trust negotiation sessions
can occur.
We also examined the systems aspects of this process and showed that trust
negotiation policies specified using the WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy standards
can be complied into a format that is suitable for analysis by Clouseau, an efficient
policy compliance checker for trust negotiation systems. This not only eases the
development of trust negotiation solutions for the web services domain, but shows
that it is possible to design a single compliance checker—namely Clouseau—that
is capable of analyzing Datalog-style policy languages, as well as other industry
standard policy languages. Furthermore, we show that the TrustBuilder2 framework
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for trust negotiation can be parameterized to act as a trust engine, as described by
the WS-Trust standard, that can be used to drive these interactions.
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A Claim Dialect Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd"
xmlns="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<xs:element name="Claim">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Attribute" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="Op">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="LT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="GT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="EQ"/>
<xs:enumeration value="LTEQ"/>
<xs:enumeration value="GTEQ"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Value" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Ownership">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="status" type="xs:boolean" />
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
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B Negotiation Extension Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/negotiation.xsd"
xmlns="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/negotiation.xsd"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<xs:import namespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy"
schemaLocation="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy/ws-policy.xsd"/>
<xs:element name="TNInit">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="OwnershipProof" type="xs:String"/>
<xs:element name="StrategyFamily" type="xs:String" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
<xs:element name="TokenFormat" type="xs:String" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="TrustNegotiationExchange">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="TokenCollection" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element ref="PolicyCollection" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="TokenCollection">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<element ref="Token" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Token">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="wst:TokenType"/>
<xs:element ref="wst:RequestedSecurityToken"/>
<xs:element name="OwnershipProof" type="xs:String"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="PolicyCollection">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="wsp:Policy" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
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